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MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES

MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES: LOOMING
DIFFICULTIES UNDER FLORIDA'S NEW JUDICIAL ARTICLE
In 1972 the voters of Florida adopted a revision of artide V of the Florida
constitution, substantially altering the state's judicial structure. The aim of
the revision was to streamline the judicial branch by eliminating the state's
multi-tiered court system and providing a more flexible, uniform court structure. Municipal, justice of the peace, magistrate, and other local courts were
abolished, and cases formerly tried in such courts were assigned to the newly
created county courts. To allow time for transition, localities were allowed
until 1977 to integrate local court operations into the new structure.
Legislative implementation of the county court provisions, however, has
failed to take into account the special nature of municipal and county ordinances. Consequently, statutory provisions applicable to ordinances and ordinance violaiions under the former system have been carried forward without
regard to their adaptability to the new system. As more localities move toward
full implementation by 1977, the inconsistencies in the present treatment of
ordinances will create increasing problems. This note will examine the nature
of municipal and county ordinance violations, show where the former treatment of ordinances has been undermined by the new system, and illuminate
some of the problems posed by legislative oversight. Finally, some proposals
will be offered to bring the treatment of ordinance violations within the progressive spirit of the constitutional revision.
THE PowER To LEGISLATE

Municipalities
Historically, municipal corporations antedate counties, or at least the notion of county government.' The lengthy existence of the municipal corporation is undoubtedly due to the desire of local residents to control local affairs. The fulfillment of this desire is said to be "the distinctive purpose and
distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper."2
Generally, a municipal corporation is created by the direct solicitation or
by the free consent of the people composing it for the promotion of their local
interests.3 Two elements of a classic definition of a municipal corporation
1. Though the great cities of Phoenicia, Egypt, and Greece are obvious examples, Roman
cities more nearly resembled the familiar municipal corporation. See Tooke, The Status of
the Municipal Corporationin American Law, 16 MINN. L. Rxv. 343, 345 (1932). This is not

to suggest that the Roman incursion into Britain laid the foundation for modern local government, for Teutonic, especially Anglo-Saxon, customs were more directly influential in
developing local government. Id. at 346; 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §18, at 16
(5th ed. 1911) (hereinafter cited as J. DILLON). Nevertheless, by the time of King John (11991216), towns and boroughs had the right of self-government, and by the time of Edward I
(1272-1307), they could return members to Parliament. 1 J. DILLON §10, at 17.
2. 1 J. DILLON §32, at 59.
3. Counties are contrasted as "involuntary quasi-corporations" having some functions
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should be emphasized. First, the incorporated body encompasses the inhabitants of a particular area or district defined in the incorporating act or
charter. 4 Implicit in this element is the notion that such inhabitants, by reason
of their density, numbers, or local and peculiar needs share a community of
interests to be benefited by incorporation. 5 Second, the purpose of the incorporation is to provide for the "happiness, convenience, health and general
welfare of the inhabitants of a local community."6 This element suggests the
incorporated body can provide services to meet the needs of the defined community.
In addition to providing services to a local area, a municipality exercises
powers of local government. 7 Traditionally, clear distinctions have been made
between the dual roles of a municipal corporation. When acting in a public
or governmental role, the municipality is in effect an arm of the state and
functions for the convenient administration of the public welfare.8 When
acting for the peculiar benefit of local residents, however, the municipality
exercises a corporate or proprietary function. 9
In performing its dual function a municipality is traditionally limited to
the exercise of express, implied, and inherent powers. 10 These limitations are
reasonable concomitants of a municipality's status as a creation of the legislature. More recently, however, the power of municipalities to legislate for their
own local affairs - commonly called "home rule" - has developed. Various
types of home rule have been identified, perhaps the most important being

characteristic of a corporate existence, but created by the sovereign power of the state without any particular solicitation or consent by the people, and directed toward the policy and
administration of state affairs. Thus, a traditional distinction has been made between the
municipality operating locally for local interests and the county operating locally for state
affairs. See I J. DILLON §§32, 35; 1 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2.07a (3d ed.
rev. 1971) (hereinafter cited as E. MCQUILLIN).
4. 1 J. DILLON §353, at 614.
5. Id.
6. City of Clearwater v. Caldwell, 75 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1954).
7. E.g., Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 134 So. 205 (1931).
8. Id. at 437, 134 So. at 208; 1 E. MCQUILLIN §2.09.
9. 1 E. McQUILLIN §2.09. The difficulty of making the important governmental-proprietary distinction often results in resolving a case on its particular facts rather than in
applying a general rule. Loeb v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 134 So. 205 (1931).
10. The classic formulation is known as Dillon's Rule: "It is a general and undisputed
proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following
powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or
fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation - not simply convenient, but indispensable." 1 J. DILLON §237, at 448-49 (italics in original). Some courts
have questioned the inherent power, reasoning that municipal corporations are creatures of
law and can derive their powers only from the law. Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 35, 126 So.
308, 321 (1930). The problem is principally one of terminology, since the same notion of
powers essential and indispensable to carry out the objects of the corporation is approved
when simply termed an implied power. E.g., Haines City v. Certain Lands, Etc., 130 Fla.
379, 382, 178 So. 143, 145 (1937).
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constitutional home rule and legislative home rule."1 Prior to 1968 Florida
12
municipalities could operate only under legislative home rule.
When the new Florida constitution was adopted in 1968 the legal posture
of municipalities was changed to provide for broader local powers. The constitutional change in effect created a constitutional home rule by explicitly
empowering municipalities to conduct municipal functions, render municipal
services, and exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise
provided by law.'3 Undoubtedly this significant shift was prompted by a
number of local concerns, among them: the requirement for increased local
services more adequately and fairly financed; a need for greater flexibility in

11. The terminology is arbitrary, though the concepts are similar among commentators.
Constitutional home rule looks for its authority in the constitution of the state, with a
distinction made as to whether the constitutional provision is self-executing or non-selfexecuting. Sparkman, The History and Status of Local Government Powers in Florida, 25
U. FLA. L. Rv. 271, 283-84 (1973). Self-executing provisions are those granting municipalities
the privilege of framing their own charters and providing in detail for the mechanics of
carrying out the privilege. E. STASSON & P. KAUPER, CASEs AND MATUAIS ON rnm LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 42-43 (3d ed. 1959). Non-self-executing provisions are those enabling the state legislature to provide by legislation for procedures for framing, adopting,
and amending charters by local government. Id. at 43. Since the legislature must affirmatively
implement the constitutional provision, this type is more accurately characterized as a constitutionally-authorized legislative home rule. However, the term "legislative home rule" is
also applied to the different situation where home rule is based solely on legislative grant.
Id. Regardless of the terminology, the important distinction to be drawn is between a
municipality's broad exercise of all powers of local government except those specifically
proscribed by the legislature (hereinafter called constitutional home rule) and a municipality's exercise of only such powers as are specifically granted by the legislature, whether on
its own initiative or in implementing a constitutional provision (hereinafter called legislative
home rule). For brief but comprehensive discussions of municipal home rule in the United
States and Florida, respectively, see Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United
States, 10 WM. fi MARY L. Rav. 269 (1968) and Sparkman, supra.
12. "The Legislature shall establish an uniform system of county and municipal government, which shall be applicable, except in cases where local or special laws for counties are
provided by the Legislature that may be inconsistent therewith. The Legislature shall by
general law classify cities and towns according to population, and shall by general law
provide for their incorporation, government, jurisdiction, powers, duties and privileges under
such classifications, and no special or local laws incorporating cities or towns, providing for
their government, jurisdiction, powers, duties and privileges shall be passed by the Legislature." FLA. CoNsr. art. MI, §24 (1885).
"The Legislature shall have the power to establish and to abolish, municipalities to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, and to alter or amend
the same at any time. When any municipality shall be abolished, provision shall be made
for the protection of its creditors." FLA. CONSr. art. VIII, §8 (1885).
13. FLA. CoNsr. art. VIII, §2(b). One commentator has pointed out that this is a hybrid
home rule, combining constitutional and legislative home rule features. Constitutional home
rule contemplates the exercise of all powers save those conflicting with general legislation,
while legislative home rule theory relies on grants of power in general and special laws. In
implementing the constitutional provision in Florida Laws 1969, ch. 69-33, the legislature
provided for the exercise of all local powers except those conflicting with general or special
law. Thus, Florida's municipal home rule is a defeasible home rule, or home rule at legislative sufferance. See Note, Municipal Ordinance Violations in Florida: Selected Due Process
Considerations,22 U. FLA. L. Rv. 580, 581 n.13 (1970).
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responding to local problems; and the prospect of less delay in waiting for
legislative attention to local affairs. 1"
No less important in effecting the change was the legislature's desire to
part with some of its responsibility over local affairs. The sheer volume of
local measures introduced tended to divert the legislature's attention from
state-wide concerns, often resulting in "log-rolling" and mere perfunctory attention to the content of local bills. 15 In the act implementing the new
municipal home rule power, the legislature provided that the statute should
be continued so as "to secure for municipalities the broad exercise of home
rule powers granted by the constitution."16 Thus, the legislature indicated its
intention to give municipalities greater local strength and flexibility. 7
Counties
In contrast to the corporate nature of municipalities, counties have long
been considered political subdivisions of the state.'8 A county's purpose is thus
administrative in nature, acting as the representative of the state's sovereignty
for the convenient conduct of local affairs.19 Consequently, prior to 1968

14. See Danahy, Reform in Progress:Local Government for Florida'sMetropolitan Areas,
40 FLA. B.J. 16 (1966); Sparkman, supra note 11, at 285.
15. Sparkman, supra note 11, at 285. The effect of the constitutional change or legislative
business can be appreciated by comparing the volume of measures introduced before and
after the change:
Regular sessions:

1963

1965

1967

1969

1970

1971

1972

General bills
Local bills

2,193
1,771

2,358
2,107

3,410
1,771

2,797
1,545

3,837
618

3,193
732

3,155
419

TOTAL

3,964

4,465

5,181

4,342

4,455

3,925

3,574

In the three sessions prior to the new constitutional provision (1963, 1965, 1967) 5,649 of
the 13,610 bills introduced, roughly 42%, were local bills. Disregarding the transitional 1969
session, in the three sessions after implementation (1970, 1971, 1972) only 1,769 of the 11,954
measures introduced, roughly 15%, were local. FLORIDA JOINT LEGISLATIVE MANAGEMENT
COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION Div., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION 1972 REGULAR SESSION FLORIDA LEGISLATURE

(Supp. 1 1972).

16. FLA. STAT. §167.005 (1971).
17. The executive and judicial attitudes toward municipal home rule may not be in
accordance with legislative desire. The attorney general opined that a city commission could
not fix the compensation of future commissioners because the city charter was silent on the
matter, notwithstanding the provisions of Florida Statutes, §167.005 (1971). Op. ATr'Y GEN.
FLA. 072-118 (1972). In City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla.
1972), the Florida supreme court used a Dillon's Rule approach to search for express municipal power to enact a rent control ordinance and, finding none, held, inter alia, that the
city had no such power. See also Sparkman, supra note 11, at 305-06.
18. See, e.g., FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §1 (1885): "The State shall be divided into political
divisions to be called counties." FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, §1(a): "The state shall be divided by
law into political subdivisions called counties."
19. An early and often cited Florida case said in regard to a county: "It may be created
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county responsibilities and powers were given by statute, and no general constitutional or statutory power to enact ordinances existed,2 0 except as to those
counties specifically authorized home rule charters under the 1885 constitution.21

While political and administrative in nature, counties nevertheless have
been pressed to take on increasing responsibilities for local matters. 22 County
governments, created at a time when municipalities were reasonably expected

to furnish whatever services were required, have struggled to cope with
phenomenal redistributions of population toward urban centers and their
fringes. 23 By assuming a role in providing services and by extending those

services to a community of interests within whole counties, county governments took on corporate functions formerly unique to municipal corporations.
The 1968 constitution recognized the changing nature of county government by providing for constitutional home rule for chartered counties24 and
making adoption of a charter government easier. 25 Chartered counties were

by the state without the solicitation, consent, or concurrence of the inhabitants of the territory thus set apart; it is created for administrative purposes; it is the representative of the
sovereignty of the state, auxiliary to it, an aid to the more convenient administration of the
government. It is purely political in character, its functions are of a public nature, constituting the machinery and essential agency by and through which many of the powers of
the state are exercised." Keggin v. Hillsborough County, 71 Fla. 356, 358, 71 So. 372 (1916).
20. Ordinances are continuing regulations, solemn and formal in nature, setting out a
permanent rule of government. Resolutions are less formal, being temporary in character and
declaratory of the will of the resolving body. Brown v. City of St. Petersburg, 111 Fla. 718,
727-28, 153 So. 141, 144 (1933) (Buford, J. concurring). A further distinction is made between
ordinances as legislative acts and resolutions as ministerial in character, relating to administrative business. 5 E. McQUxLIN §15.02, at 43-44. Thus an ordinance can partake of the
nature of a local "law" within its jurisdiction. 5 E. McQuitLw §15.01, at 40.
21. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §9 (Jacksonville and Duval County); §10 (Key West and
Monroe County); §11(b) (Dade County); §24(1) (Hillsborough County) (1885).
22. Note, The Urban County: A Study of New Approaches to Local Government in
MetropolitanAreas, 73 HARv. L. Ray. 526 (1960).
23. See Danahy, supra note 14; Note, supra note 22; Legislative Note, Constitutional
Revision: County Home Rule in Florida- The Need for Expansion, 19 U. FLA. L. Ray. 282
(1966).
The legislature, also recognizing the inadequacy of municipal powers in meeting local
needs, created special tax and service districts. By 1968 these special districts, established for
single purposes such as fire protection or sewage disposal, numbered nearly 1,000. Sparkman,
supra note 11, at 286. They were subject to criticism because their governing bodies were
appointed by the Governor and were not directly responsible to the electorate, over which
they often exercised taxing power. Danahy, supra note 14, at 17-18. See also Note, Special
District Taxation, 13 U. FLA. L. RPv. 531 (1960).
In addition, the legislature enacted statutes empowering counties to act with broad
discretion with regard to certain concerns. For example, Florida Statutes, §133.01 (1969)
(repealed by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-14) set out procedures whereby counties could adopt and
enforce zoning and building regulations in unincorporated areas.
24. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §1(g).
25. Formerly, a county charter government began with a local study commission whose
recommendations were submitted to the legislature. If the legislature approved the proposal,
it was submitted to the electors of the whole state for approval as an amendment to the state
constitution. If the amendment was adopted, a home rule charter was drawn up and sub-
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given all powers of local government not inconsistent with general or special
law.2 6 Non-chartered counties were given such powers as might be provided by
general or special law.27 Significantly, the constitutional provisions specifically
empowered both charter and non-charter counties to enact ordinances for selfgovernment. 28 The provisions for county government were subsequently implemented by legislation reflecting the wide scope of powers. 29 By thus expanding the scope of permissible county activity and increasing the powers
to govern local affairs, the 1968 constitution reflects a recognition that historic
differences between municipalities and counties have been blurred. Providing
increased services to local communities has given counties a corporate character that has often overshadowed their function as state subdivisions.
THE POWER To ENFORCE ORDINANCES

Municipalities
The power of a municipality to enforce its ordinances is given by statute
and includes "such pains, penalties and forfeitures" as may be needed. 0 The
precise nature of a municipal ordinance violation and the prosecution theremitted to the electors of the county. If the charter was approved, organization of the charter
government proceeded in accordance with the provisions of the charter. For accounts of the
Metropolitan Dade experience, see Note, supra note 22, at 529-33; Legislative Note, supra
note 23, at 285-86.
Under the 1968 constitution and its implementing legislation, a charter commission is
established by vote of the county commission or by petition of 15% of the county electors.
After study and public hearings, but within eighteen months of its first meeting, the charter
commission must submit a proposed charter to the county commission. The county commission must then call for a special referendum to be held within 45 to 90 days for approval by a majority of the electors voting. The charter so adopted is then implemented
according to its terms. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §1(c); FLA. STAT. §§125.60-.64 (1971).
26. This provision is self-executing, giving all powers except those specifically limited
by law. FLA. CONSr. art. VIII, §1(g).
27. This provision is non-self-executing, depending on the legislature to provide specific
powers. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, §l(f).
28. The power of the two types of county government was limited, however. A charter
county could adopt ordinances not inconsistent with general law, a provision seemingly
parallel to the self-executing nature of its power. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §1(g). A non-charter
county could adopt ordinances not inconsistent with general or local law, also parallel to
the nature of its power. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §l(f).
29. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-234 first implemented the county home rule provisions, expressing in broad terms the powers of county government, providing for exercise of the
powers by ordinance, mandating a liberal construction of local powers, and defining the
punishment for violation of ordinances. The latter provision appeared as FLA. STAT. §125.69
(1971), while the other three provisions appeared as Fla. Stat. §125.65 (1969). In 1971, Fla.
Laws 1971, ch. 71-14 repealed §125.65 as part of a revision and extensive enumeration of
county powers. Both chapters 69-234 and 71-14 altered the constitutional provisions slightly
in providing that ordinances could not conflict with general or special law, without distinguishing charter and non-charter counties. See note 28 supra. One observer has noted
the significance of the differences between the legislation and the constitution. See Sparkman,
supra note 11, at 295.
30. FLA. STAT. §165.19 (1971).
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for is, however, unclear. The weight of authority holds it is in the nature of
a civil action for the recovery of a debt.3 1 A minority of jurisdictions consider
it to be in the nature of a criminal action, particularly where it is also declared a misdemeanor or is prosecuted in the state's name.32
Florida's treatment of municipal ordinance violations is mixed. In Wright
v. Worth 33 a municipal ordinance violation was held not to be such a "crim34
inal prosecution" as to require indictment. In City of Miami v. Gilbert,

however, punishment of ordinance violations was held to be more criminal
than civil in nature, and thus costs could not be recovered upon successful
appeal of an ordinance conviction. 35 In other contexts use of a conviction for
violation of a municipal ordinance as a criminal conviction for purposes of
impeachment of a witness has not been allowed,3 6 even though its criminal
character is recognized for claims of double jeopardy.3 At best it may be said
that municipal ordinance violations are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, but partake of some features of both types of proceedings.38
Prior to the revision of article V, the special nature of municipal ordinance
violations was logically consistent with the municipal court structure provided
for enforcement. As the municipal executive, the mayor was charged by general law with enforcing ordinances. 3s Although municipal charters commonly

31. 9 E. MCQUILLIN §27.06, at 610 and cases cited therein.
32. Id. at 614-15.
33. 83 Fla. 204, 91 So. 87 (1922). Petitioner was arrested for possession of alcoholic
beverages in violation of a municipal ordinance and tried in the municipal court on a
police docket entry. She contended, inter alia, that a police docket entry failed to meet the
constitutional requirements of an indictment sufficient to inform an accused of the criminal
charges against him, as provided in FLA. CONsT. Del. of Rights §11 (1885).
34. 102 So. 2d 818 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
35. But see Wood v. City of Jacksonville, 248 So. 2d 176 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1971), wherein
it was held that costs could be recovered on successful appeal of a municipal ordinance
violation where so provided by statute and rules of procedure. In its decision, the court
assumed without discussion that municipal ordinance violations were criminal in nature.
36. McClain v. United States, 224 F.2d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 1955); Roe v. State, 96 Fla.
723, 731, 119 So. 118, 121 (1928).
37. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970), can be read to support this contention. The
Supreme Court, following the lead of the Florida district court of appeal in "assuming but
not holding" that the same act was involved in both a municipal conviction and a state
felony prosecution, reversed the felony conviction on grounds of double jeopardy. Id. at 390,
395. Both the defendant and the state directly addressed the quixotic character of municipal
prosecutions. Brief for Petitioner at 15-21, Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Waller v. State,
397 U.S. 387 (1970). The court, however, considered the question in terms of two courts
within one state placing a defendant on trial for the same alleged crime. 397 U.S. at 890.
Further, because the Court adopted the lower court's assumption that the municipal offenses were lesser included offenses of the felony charge, the decision is less than a dear
declaration that municipal ordinance prosecutions are criminal. Id. at 390, 395.
38. This idea is often expressed by calling ordinance violations "quasi-criminal." See,
e.g., City of Miami v. Gilbert, 102 So. 2d 818, 819 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). Such an appellation
does not, however, significantly clarify the status or treatment of ordinance violations.
39. FLA. STAT. §168.01 (1971). Where special acts or municipal charters assigned the
responsibility to a police chief or city manager, the statute presumably deferred to the
particular act, under the rule of statutory construction that a special act takes precedence
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provided for municipal courts, 40 the mayor was also empowered by general
law to establish a mayor's court for the enforcement of ordinances. 41 Thus,
an ordinance promulgated by the municipal governing body was executed by
the municipal executive and enforced in a municipal court.
Article V provides, however, that municipal courts shall be abolished42
and jurisdiction over municipal ordinance violations vested in the newly created county courts.43 Although municipal prosecutors may prosecute municipal
ordinance violations,44 over-all prosecutorial responsibility for the circuit and
county courts rests with the state attorneys. 45 Thus, under the new judicial
structure, a locally-enacted ordinance is prosecuted by a state officer in a state
court.
Punishment for violations of municipal ordinances may include fine, imprisonment, or both. 46 Although the general statute authorizing such punishment imposes a maximum limit of 500 dollars fine and sixty days imprisons
ment 4 7 the Florida supreme court held in State ex rel. Johnson v. Vizzinij
that where a municipal charter authorized a maximum imprisonment of six
months the longer limit would prevail. The court reasoned that the charter
was a special act and thus prevailed over the general act. 49 The decision in
Vizzini is, however, subject to criticism on the grounds that the Florida constitution prohibits special laws pertaining to punishment for crime.5 ° Al-

over a general act. For an application of this rule of construction in a different context, see
text accompanying note 49 infra.
40. See, e.g., GAINESVILLE, FLA. CHARTER §13, abolished by Gainesville, Fla. Ordinance
No. 1844, Oct. 30, 1972.
41. FLA. STAT. §168.02 (1971).
42. The constitutional provision permits municipal courts to continue their same jurisdiction until Jan. 3, 1977, or until such is amended or terminated by law, whichever comes
first. The statute implementing this provision authorizes the abolition of municipal courts
by ordinance and sets out procedures by which such abolition is to be effected. FLA. CONST.
art. V, §20(d)(4); FLA. STAT. §168.031 (Supp. 1972).
43. FLA. CONST. art. V, §20(c)(4); FLA. STAT. §34.01 (Supp. 1972). In addition to municipal
and county ordinance violations, county courts have original jurisdiction over all misdemeanor cases not cognizable by the circuit courts, and actions at law in which the amount
in controversy does not exceed $2,500. These courts assumed the jurisdiction previously exercised by county judges' courts, county courts, claims courts, small claims courts, small
claims magistrates courts, magistrates courts, justice of the peace courts, municipal courts,
and courts of chartered counties.
44. FLA. CONST. art. V, §20(c)(12); FLA. STAT. §34.13(5) (Supp. 1972).
45. FLA. CONST. art. V, §17; FLA. STAT. §34.13 (Supp. 1972).
46. FLA. STAT. §165.19 (1971).
47. Id.
48. 227 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1969).
49. Id. at 207. Neither of the cases cited by the court in support of this rationale, State
ex rel. Bodner v. Carbonelli, 80 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1955), and Bauer v. City of Gulfport, 195
So. 2d 571 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967), dealt with a special law punishing crime.
50. "There shall be no special law or general law of local application pertaining to ...
(4) punishment for crime ....
" FLA. CONST. art. III, §II (reenacting §20 of article III of
the 1885 constitution). Cases construing the current provision and its predecessor have held
that local acts imposing punishments are invalid as to the prescribed penalties, but may be
enforced under the punishment provisions of general law. See Delmonico v. State, 155 So. 2d
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though ordinance violations might be distinguished under the current view
that such violations are not crimes but merely criminal in nature,5 1 the
rationale of uniform punishment inherent in the constitutional provision and
the general statute 2 militates toward application of the constitutional limitation to municipal offenses. Where longer limits in special acts are allowed to
prevail, the maximum punishment for an ordinance violation can exceed the
53
maximum penalty for a second-degree misdemeanor.
Counties
While the 1968 constitution provides counties with home rule powers,
including the power to enact ordinances, it makes only general provision for
the enforcement of such ordinances.54 Following adoption of the new constitution, the 1969 legislature implemented county home rule powers in broad
terms5 5 providing specifically for the punishment of county ordinance violations.56 Although the enabling act placed prosecutorial responsibility and
jurisdiction in the county officer and court having authority over misdemeanors and although the punishment paralleled a misdemeanor conviction,
the act failed to specify that a county ordinance violation was in fact a mis57
demeanor.
Obvious problems were created by the failure to define county ordinance
violations more specifically. Jurisdiction was defined generally because of the
variety of courts among the counties exercising misdemeanor jurisdiction.
Depending on local circumstances, misdemeanors were tried in justice of the

368, 371 n.11 (Fla. 1963); Lynch v. Durrance, 77 So. 2d 458, 459-60 (Fla. 1955); Taulty v.
Hobby, 71 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1954); Op. ATr'y GEN. FLA. 072-43 (1972).
51. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
52. FLA. STAT. §165.19 (1971).
53. The maximum fine for a misdemeanor of the second degree is $500. FLA. STAT.
§775.083 (1971). The maximum term of imprisonment is 60 days. FLA. STAT. §775.082(5)(b)
(Supp. 1972).
54. "Persons violating county ordinances shall be prosecuted and punished as provided
by law." FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §1(j).
55. See note 29 supra. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-234 provided: "Counties shall have all
powers of local self-government including governmental, corporate and proprietary powers
to enable them to conduct county government, perform county functions and render county
services, and may exercise any such power for county purposes, for the health, safety or
welfare of its [sic] citizens, not inconsistent with general or special law."
56. "Persons violating county ordinances shall be prosecuted by the prosecuting officer
in the county having authority to prosecute misdemeanors and upon conviction in a court
having jurisdiction of misdemeanors shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $500 or by
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed 60 days or by both such fine and imprisonment." Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-234(3), codified as FLA. STAT. §125.69 (1969).
57. The common legislative practice was to specify the prohibited conduct as being a
misdemeanor or felony, and to provide the measure of punishment. See, e.g., Fla. Laws
1969, ch. 69-274, codified as FLA. STAT. §877.13 (1971), ch. 69-313, codified as FLA. STAT.
§831.29 (1971).
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peace courts,5 8 county judge's courts, 59 county courts, 60 criminal courts of
record,6 1 and circuit courts. 62 To provide a place for trial of county ordinance

violations and yet compensate for the existence of various courts, language was
used that would vest jurisdiction in the court with jurisdiction over the mildest form of crime. But an ordinance violation was not a crime, for only
3
felonies and misdemeanors are denominated crimes.6
A parallel problem was the determination of procedural law to apply in
the trial of county ordinance violations. The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure applied to "all criminal proceedings in state courts,"64 but these rules
were said to be inapplicable to municipal courts65 and to violations of municipal and county ordinances. 6 Further, it was unclear in whose name - the
state's or the county's - prosecutions for ordinance violations were to be
brought. Nor was it clear, after conviction was obtained, of what the defendant was guilty.
To remedy these shortcomings the legislature in its next session amended
the enabling act to specify that violations of county ordinances were to be
misdemeanors prosecuted in the name of the state.6 7 Thus, problems regarding
the nature of an ordinance violation, the rules applicable in the trial thereof,
and the effects of a conviction were apparently resolved. However, by a
blanket provision that a county ordinance violation is a misdemeanor, the
legislature impliedly delegated to the various county commissions the power
to create and define crimes.65
The adoption of the revision of article V obviated the need for the
circuitous language previously used regarding county ordinances. By reducing
the patchwork of trial courts to two types and defining their respective jurisdictions, the revision made clear where county ordinance violations were to
be tried.69 The language used in both the revised constitutional article and
the implementing legislation is significant. A clear distinction is made between
58. FLA. CONST. art. V, §11(2); Fla. Stat. §37.01 (1971), repealed by Fla. Laws 1972, ch.
72-358(1), ch. 72-404 (30).
59. FLA. CONST. art. V, §7(3); Fla. Stat. §36.01(4) (1971), repealed by Fla. Laws 1972, ch.
72-404(30).
60. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §8; FLA. STAT. §34.01(4) (1971), amended by Fla. Laws 1972, ch.
72-404(9).
61. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §9(2); Fla. Stat. §32.01 (1971), repealed by Fla. Laws 1972, ch.
72-404(30).
62. FLA. CONST. art. V, §6(3).
63. FLA. STAT. §§775.05, .08 (1971).
64. FLA. R. CRII. P. 1.010, now renumbered 3.010.
65. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.010 (Committee Note), 33 FLA. STAT. ANN. (1967).
66. Author's Comment, FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.010, 33 FLA. STAT. ANN. (1967).
67. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-234, amended by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-452, codified as FLA.
STAT. §125.69 (1971): "Violations of county ordinances are misdemeanors and shall be
prosecuted in the name of the State of Florida in a court having jurisdiction of misdemeanors by the prosecuting attorney thereof, and upon conviction shall be punished by a
fine not to exceed $500 or by imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed 60 days or by
both such fine and imprisonment."
68. See text accompanying notes 76-86 infra.
69. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §20(c)(4); FLA. STAT. §34.01 (Supp. 1972). See note 43 supra.
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"criminal misdemeanors" and "violations of ... county ordinances," suggesting that such ordinance violations are not intended to be within the criminal
category. 70 Further, the grouping of municipal and county ordinance violations in one category and crimes in another in various statutes suggests an
intention, or at least an assumption, that both types of ordinance violations
should be treated alike. Nevertheless, the misdemeanor definition of county
ordinance violations in Florida Statutes, section 125.69, was not amended
71
upon adoption of the new article.
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE OLD SYSTEM

There is little doubt that the judicial structure created by the revised
article V represents a "sweeping move to modernization, uniformity, and
consolidation."72 The promise and potential of the new structure nevertheless
should not obscure some merits of the old system. For example, the municipality formerly derived its corporate and governmental identity from its
charter, which created the municipality's legal existence, defined its boundaries, authorized municipal self-government, and provided the mechanisms of
operation. One who violated an ordinance appeared in a municipal court and
was appropriately punished by municipal authorities. Since no sovereign was
involved, no stigma of crime could attach.
County prosecutions were treated somewhat less consistently. Prior to 1968
non-home-rule counties had no power to enact ordinances. County affairs
were thus governed primarily by state law and offenses punished as violations
thereof. 73 Though offenses were commonly designated misdemeanors and
punished as crimes, they were so designated by the legislative body of the
sovereign. 74 When the 1968 constitution authorized counties to enact ordinances, problems of practicality as well as consistent treatment of ordinance

70. "County courts shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal misdemeanor cases not
cognizable by the circuit courts, of all violations of municipal and county ordinances ....
FA. CONST. art. V, §20(c)(4); FLA. STAT. §34.01(1) (Supp. 1972).
71.

It is possible that this statute was merely overlooked by the legislature following

adoption of article V. That it still prescribes the punishment in terms of fine and punishment suggests it was overlooked in the comprehensive revision classifying felonies and misdemeanors according to degree and assigning punishment by degree. Fla. Laws 1971, ch.

71-136. Oversight would also account for the frequent and otherwise redundant use of the
term "municipal and county ordinance violations" as juxtaposed to "crimes" or "misdemeanors." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §23.103 (1971) (one dollar assessed as court costs against each
person convicted for "violation of a state penal or criminal statute or convicted for violation of a municipal or county ordinance"); FLA. STAT. §901.151(2) (1971) (law enforcement
officer may stop and frisk violator of "criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances
of any municipality or county"): Fla. Laws 1972, ch. 72-733 (funds appropriated to public
defenders' offices to defend insolvents charged with "misdemeanors or violations of municipal
or county ordinances").
72. Florida supreme court Chief Justice B. K. Roberts' State of the Judiciary message to
The Florida Bar, June 20, 1972, reprinted in 46 FLA. B.J. 457 (1972).
73. See text accompanying notes 19, 20 supra,
74. See authorities cited note 23 supra.
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violations arose. On one hand were increased powers of counties to govern
local affairs by ordinance; on the other were problems of where and how to
punish ordinance violations. The reconciling expedient chosen was a declaration that such violations were crimes over which the state court system had
jurisdiction. Thus, if the governing bodies of both a county and a municipality within that county proscribed certain conduct, the county violator was
tried for crime in the state court, while the municipal violator was tried for
an offense in the municipal court. Whatever tenuous consistency that arrangement might have had is lost under the new article and current law, for
now both violators will be tried in the same court - one for crime, the other
for "violation of an ordinance."
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE

NEw

ARTICLE V

Municipalities are allowed until January 3, 1977, to abolish their municipal courts3 5 As that date approaches and the judicial article nears com-

plete implementation, more courts will encounter the latent difficulties
therein. Although this study is not exhaustive, several potential problem areas
can be identified.
Delegation of Crime-MakingPower
The question of whether the legislature can appropriately delegate to
counties the power to declare and define crimes, as has been done in Florida
Statutes, section 125.69,76 lingers from the previous structure. Crime is said
to be an act or omission prohibited by public law for the protection of the
public and punishable by the state in its own name.7 7 It contemplates an offense against a sovereign authority 8 and is proscribed within the boundaries
of the enacting state.7 9 The power to define criminal offenses and impose
penalties for violations rests in the legislature1s The principle is well established that the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law,8 1 and the
Florida supreme court has refined this notion by observing: 82
[T]he true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what the law shall
be, and the conferring of authority or discretion in executing the law
pursuant to and within the confines of the law itself.
75.

FLA. CONST. art. V, §20(d)(4).

76. See note 67 supra.
77. W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIES §2.01, at 92 (rev. 7th
ed. 1967).
78. State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 84, 28 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1947).
79. McClain v. United States, 224 F.2d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 1955).
80. Watson v. State, 190 So. 2d 161, 166 (Fla. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 960 (1967).
81. E.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Bailey v. Van Pelt, 78 Fla. 337,
82 So. 789 (1919).
82. Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., 216 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1968), appeal after remand, 240
So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1970).
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Applying these principles, Florida Statutes, section 125.69, declaring county
ordinance violations to be misdemeanors, is susceptible to challenge as an
improper delegation of legislative power. County commissions enacting ordinances that will be enforced and punished as offenses against the sovereign
are, in effect, making the law. By virtue of this statute, the commissions,
rather than the legislature, are exercising discretion as to what the law shall
be.
Aside from the question of the power to delegate, the wisdom of delegating
the crime-defining power to counties is questionable. The Wisconsin supreme
court, one of the few to consider the question directly, held that the state may
not delegate the power to create a crime, reasoning that to do so was an attempt to confer sovereignty on the county.8 3 Criminal law theory regards a
crime as an offense against the "people" and not merely a transgression
against some small segment thereof.8s Since Florida courts have recognized this
local territorial aspect by holding that municipal ordinance violations are not
crimes,85 it follows that similar treatment should be accorded county ordinance violations. No sound basis in reason or theory justifies punishing as a
crime conduct that a county commission of five members has ordained to
offend the county. Such justification as may once have existed for declaring
county ordinance violations to be misdemeanors has been obviated by the
provisions of the new article V. 6
Overcriminalization
Legal scholars have recently focused attention on the use and misuse of
the criminal sanction. 7 "Overcriminalization" - the misuse of that sanction occurs when the proscribed conduct involves no victim, because the participants are willing or the defendant himself is the "victim," or when the
interest of the victim is so insubstantial that the criminal sanction is unwarranted. s8 Although the problem of overcriminalization is usually considered
with respect to morals, illness, and nuisance statutes, 9 it has been appropriately discussed in connection with municipal ordinances. 90 Ordinances in particular often fail one of several criteria recognized for the optimal use of the

83. State ex rel. Keefe v. Schmiege, 251 Wis. 79, 84, 28 N.W.2d 345, 348 (1947). For a
collection of cases on the question, see Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1343 (1948).
84. W. CLARK & W. MTARsALL, supra note 77, at 99-100.
85. Boyd v. County of Dade, 123 So. 2d 323, 329 (Fla. 1960).

86. See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
87. See, e.g., H. PAcKER, THE Lrnrrs oF =z

CRIMINAL SANCTION

(1968); Kadish, The

Crisis of Overcriminalization,7 Am. Cum. L.Q. 17 (1968).
88. J. CAMPBELL, J. SAHED, g- D. STANG, LAW AND ORDER REcONsmERED 600-01 (Report
of the Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement to the National Comm'n on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, 1970) [hereinafter cited as LAw AND ORDER RECONSIDMERED].
89. Id. at 601-02.
90. Platt, An Odd Couple: The Criminal Sanction and The Municipal Ordinance, 7
WsL.A ETm LJ.

43, 63-65 (1971).
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criminal sanction: that no reasonable alternatives to the criminal sanction
exist for dealing with a problem. 91 Where criminal sanctions are applied to
enforce ordinances serving local regulatory or social aims, the dividends of
overcriminalization are realized in disrespect for the law, damage to the legitimate aims of law, distraction of resources from more serious misconduct, and
discriminatory enforcement.92 The Florida Legislature has recently reflected
a sensitivity to this problem in a proposed revision of Florida's criminal
code. 93 One of the stated purposes therein is "[t]o safeguard conduct that is
without fault or legitimate state interest from being condemned as criminal." 9 4
Unfortunately, the bill devotes little attention to municipal and county ordinance violations and contains no reference whatsoever to Florida Statutes,
section 125.69.
Inequity and Equal Protection
Often the sole contact of the average citizen with the judicial system occurs when he is hauled into court for an ordinance violation. His lasting impression of the whole legal system is likely to be based on his experience in
the lower courts. Unschooled in the fine distinctions between a municipal
ordinance violation that is "quasi-criminal" and a county ordinance violation
that is in fact criminal, he is likely to take a jaundiced view of the unequal
treatment he encounters. If his is a municipal ordinance violation in an article
V county court, he may encounter a fellow citizen charged with a similar offense under a county ordinance. If both receive maximum sentences of a 500
dollar fine and sixty days imprisonment, it will be little consolation that his
conviction was for a mere "ordinance violation" and not for a "crime."
Further, without definitive guidance, it is presently unclear which rights are
afforded a municipal defendant and which denied him by virtue of the municipal charter and ordinance under which he is tried. Nor is it clear which
rights withheld in the municipal courts should now inhere in the proceedings
by virtue of their trial in state courts. Whether the inconsistencies and inequities in the treatment of ordinance violators denies them due process or
equal protection of the law remains to be resolved. Certainly decisions such
as Waller v. Florida9- and Argersinger v. Hamlin96 suggest that disparate
treatment based on mere pro forma distinctions is subject to attack.
Notwithstanding the constitutional questions, it is clear that the historic
differences between counties and municipalities have been blurred. Where
counties have been given corporate and governmental powers comparable to

91.

H.

PACKER,

92. See LAW

supra note 87,

at 296.

AND ORDER RECONSIDERED at

600; Platt, supra note 90, at 64-65.

93. Fla. H.B. 2179 (Reg. Sess. 1973), introduced by Committee on Criminal Justice, Rep.
Shreve and others [hereinafter cited as Fla. H.B. 2179].
94. Fla. H.B. 2179, §2(5) (emphasis added).
95. 397 U.S. 387 (1970). See note 37 supra.
96. 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to appointed counsel extended to misdemeanor prosecutions where risk of loss of liberty exists).
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municipalities, and courts established with express jurisdiction over county
ordinance violations, any reason for different treatment of municipal and
county ordinance violations is lost. Similarity of treatment is particularly
commended by the organic rather than merely structural change in county
function. As counties have assumed greater responsibilities in serving and
governing identifiable community interests, their importance as state subdivisions has been eclipsed by their increasing resemblance to municipal
bodies.
PROPOSALS
To resolve some of the abiding difficulties under present law, the following changes are proposed for either serial or comprehensive adoption:
1. Removal of the current criminal character from county ordinance violations. County activities have come to resemble those of municipalities in their local nature. Since municipal and county ordinances
are commonly considered in pari materia,97 they should be treated alike
in the courts. Removal of the criminal stigma from a purely local transgression is particularly necessary where originally imposed for purposes
of jurisdiction and procedure. Continuation of the criminal aspect compounds and perpetuates the problem of overcriminalization.
2. Definition of the nature of municipaland county ordinanceviolations. Continued piecemeal definition of ordinance violations as criminal for some purposes and civil for other purposes is inconsistent with
Florida's efforts to streamline and modernize the judicial system. The
legislature has displayed a willingness to depart from old forms and to
recognize new classifications in proposed legislation. 98 Ordinance violations should be made a part of any comprehensive revision, either
within a class of "violations" or in a separate class.99
3. Promulgation of rules of procedure for the trial of ordinance
violations. Such rules would create uniformity throughout the state and

97. W. Clark 8- W. Marshall, supra note 77, at 99-100.
98. Fla. H.B. 2179. The bill defines felonies and misdemeanors and creates a new class
of offenses called "violations." A violation is "any offense that is punishable under the laws
of this state or that would be punishable if committed in this state, by no other penalty
than a fine, forfeiture or other civil penalty." Fla. H.B. 2179, §4(3). Inexplicably, this bill
leaves ordinance violations in limbo, for a misdemeanor "shall not mean any conviction for
any violation . . . of any municipal or county ordinance," Fla. H.B. 2179, §4(2), and yet a
violation "shall not mean any conviction for any violation of any . . . municipal or county
ordinance." Fla. H.B. 2179, §4(3). Thus, under this bill, ordinance violations are neither
"misdemeanors" nor "violations," but it is not made clear what they are.
99. Ordinance violations could be grouped with "violations" in the plan presented in
Fla. H.B. 2179, if the Igislature determines to remove imprisonment as a punishment for
ordinances. Such a determination is, of course, a policy decision. Short of such a determination, an additional class of "infractions" or "ordinance violations" could be created to indude both a fine and imprisonment, but removing the element of criminality. Inclusion of
ordinance violations within a comprehensive revision would comport with its stated purpose "[t]o give fair warning to the people of the State of Florida in understandable language
of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction."
Fla. H.B. 2179, §2(2).
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among the county courts. The establishment of special rules for ordinance violations is consistent with the provision of rules for other
specialized proceedings.100 In addition, rules of procedure would facilitate a particularized definition of ordinance violations as proposed
above.
4. Elimination of incarceration as a sanction for the violation of
ordinances. Use of the fine would leave revenues from violations intact
for a substantial number of cases. 10 Economies could be realized by
elimination of many of the trappings of criminal procedure now necessitated by the risk of loss of liberty. 1 2 The collection of fines could be
enforced by attachment and forfeiture proceedings and by installment
payments of fines.' 0 3 Repeated or multiple violators could be impris04
oned, but only after full trial on criminal charges under state law.1
Finally, the social problems covered by ordinances, such as public
drunkenness, could be medically treated rather than tried. 05
CONCLUSION

The adoption of article V was a significant step toward modernization of
the judicial system in Florida. Implementation and full operation of such a
dramatic change naturally uncovers problems unforeseen in the planning
stages. Replacing the patchwork quilt of local courts with a new blanket of
state courts has not removed all the underlying difficulties, and legislative and
judicial attention to the problems of local ordinances in the county courts is
required. As more localities make the transition to the new judicial structure,
it may be anticipated that the problems will increase in importance. Attention
at the present stage could well head off many such problems.
DONALD

S.

HART, JR.

100. E.g., FLORIDA RULES OF PROBATE AND GUARDIANSHIP PROcEDURE; FLORIDA RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR TRAFFIC COuRTs; FLORIDA SUMMARY CLAIMS PROCEDURE RuLFS.
101. See Platt, supra note 90, at 68.
102. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), requires the provision of counsel
in any case where the defendant risks a loss of liberty. FLA. R. CiuM. P. 3.111 applies this
rule to state courts, and the Florida attorney general has suggested that municipal courts
also comply, Op. ATr'Y GEN. FLA. 073-45 (1973). Elimination of the imprisonment penalty
would reduce the costs of providing this and other entitlements to ordinance violators.
103. See Platt, supra note 90, at 71.
104. Id. at 72.
105. Id. at 69.
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